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Main contractors use bid shopping to reduce a subcontractor's quoted price. The 
literature suggests that this is a practice disliked by many subcontractors and that the 
subcontractor's loss of revenue and margin is an important consequence. The vast 
majority of subcontractors in New Zealand are small in size, thus bid shopping can 
lead to subcontractors having greater exposure to additional financial risk, arising 
from the reduced margins they must accept. Whilst bid shopping has been mentioned 
as part of research on issues such as ethics and tendering practice, few empirical 
studies have directly focussed on bid shopping, and specifically, sought the 
perceptions of subcontractors themselves on the effects of bid shopping on their 
business. A questionnaire-based semi-structured interview survey of subcontractors 
was conducted, seeking their opinions on the prevalence, and seriousness of, bid 
shopping, what the effects of it are, and what measures they took to prevent their 
quotes from being bid shopped. The results established that bid shopping takes place 
regularly and is a matter of much concern to subcontractors, having a negative 
influence on their pricing decisions and the quality of the work they do. It also places 
more stress on the subcontractor‟s staff and limits the growth of their business. 
Significant implications for the construction industry are associated with safety on 
site, the quality of the subcontracted work, and the image of the main contractor in the 
market place. A link was suggested between the incidence of bid shopping and the 
state of the construction market. 
Keywords: bidding, bid shopping, ethics, sub-contracting, tendering. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bid shopping, an American term, refers to the practice of reducing the subcontractor's 
quoted price in a particular manner. May, Wilson and Skitmore (2001), in an 
empirical survey of Australian bid shopping practice, explain that the reduction is 
achieved by providing the lowest quoted price already received, as an inducement to 
competing subcontractors, who will then underbid the original quote if they want the 
work. The main contractor then either accepts the new lower price or else approaches 
the subcontractor that submitted the lowest initial quote with a request to match the 
new price. 
Bid shopping first attracted construction researchers in the 1980s: Uher and Runeson 
(1984) conducted an interview survey of Australian subcontractors on pre- and post-
tender negotiations, which included the issue of bid shopping. Hinze and Tracey 
(1994) highlighted the issue once more in their survey of American subcontractors, 
and the more recent survey of various issues in subcontracting practice by Arditi and 
Chotibhongs (2005) found the practice to be common in the USA, as it is in Australia, 
where it is perceived as being a problem (May et al. 2001). In a desktop review of 
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American bid shopping practice, Degn and Miller (2003) asserted that one of the 
consequential detrimental effects of bid shopping is, perhaps most significantly, that it 
negates the benefits of competitive tendering. They go on to assert that bid shopping 
exposes the subcontractor to additional financial risk, arising from the reduced 
margins it must accept, or risk losing the work. This is of particular significance to 
this present study; since subcontractors determine the main contractor's performance, 
it would seem logical to determine whether bid shopping has any effect on the 
subcontractor's business. This aspect appears not to have received much attention in 
the literature. This research, therefore, seeks to investigate the subcontractor‟s view of 
the impact of bid shopping on the subcontracting firm.  
Crowley Hager and Garrick (2000) examined the position of small subcontractors in 
the Australian construction industry, and suggested that the small subcontractor's 
attitude to business is based upon the need to compete in a very competitive market; 
with low margins prolonging under-capitalisation, which in turn prevents growth, 
perpetuating low margins. This may be especially so in New Zealand, where small 
subcontracting firms play a hugely significant role; the proportion of small (i.e. 0-9 
employees) firms is consistently in the region of 94% of all subcontractors (Statistics 
New Zealand 2008). 
Most previous empirical studies in the field have been focussed specifically on topics 
other than bid shopping (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005; Hinze and Tracey 1994; 
Jackson 2005; Vee and Skitmore 2003; Zwick and Miller 2004). Other research did 
not focus specifically on the subcontractor's perceptions of bid shopping (May et al. 
2001; Smith Mojica and Clarke 2006). There has been little research with a focus on 
the subcontractor's perceptions of the impact of bid shopping on their business, 
particularly of smaller sized subcontractors, who arguably suffer more severely the 
detrimental effects of bid shopping. The only empirical study found which was 
concerned with subcontractors' perceptions of bid shopping (Shash 1998) was a postal 
questionnaire survey investigating bidding practices of subcontractors in the USA. 
However, characteristically of postal surveys, it suffered from a very low response 
rate of less than 10%, and only one section of five in the questionnaire related to bid 
shopping, and didn't seek subcontractors' views on the impact of bid shopping on their 
business. 
As distinct from this body of earlier work, this present study aims to canvass 
subcontractors to determine their perceptions of the impact of bid shopping on their 
own business, and what steps they take to counter the practice, if any. Due to the (self-
imposed) constraint of a small sample size, a face-to-face, semi-structured interview 
survey approach was used, utilising a questionnaire informed by the (albeit limited) 
literature. The target sample population was limited to that of mechanical and 
electrical "specialist" subcontractors in Auckland, New Zealand. The authors felt that 
these trades were most likely to experience bid shopping, due to their common 
characteristics (in Auckland, at least) of being generally smaller firms; specialist in 
nature, operating in an extremely competitive market, but with a comparatively high 
value of subcontracts, relative to "trade" subcontractors.  
BID SHOPPING 
When bid shopping occurs during the tendering stage, it is known as pre-award bid 
shopping. When it takes place after the award of the main contract it is known as post-
award bid shopping. Before examining these two types of bid shopping, it is worth 
briefly addressing other methods by which tender prices can be reduced. Alternatives 
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include reverse auctions, which are described as one sided, descending, open bids 
(Bieberstein 2002, cited in Horlen, Eldin and Ajinka 2005). In a reverse auction the 
buyer invites sellers to bid. The term 'one sided' refers to the one-to-many relationship 
(one buyer invites many sellers). The term 'descending' refers to the falling bid prices 
as the bidders compete until the auction time expires. Reynolds (2001) groups reverse 
auctions into 4 types: English, Dutch, Yankee and Vickrey (cited in Horlern et al. 
2005). Bid shopping can be mistakenly referred to as a reverse auction or as a "Dutch 
auction". These reverse auctions are conducted according to set rules including 
disclosure of information. All the participating bidders know the current lowest bid 
and are invited to underbid it (Horlern et al. 2005). Bidders take part willingly and the 
rules are known to all, whereas in bid shopping the owner of the bid that is being 
shopped has no knowledge that his bid is being used to coerce other bidders into 
reducing their bids. Clearly, they are quite different. 
Pre-award bid shopping 
Some researchers consider this type of bid shopping to be more acceptable to 
subcontractors because it is viewed as the inevitable part of free competition, and also 
because they believe that the client benefits from the resulting lower prices (Degn and 
Miller 2003; Hinze and Tracey 1994). Furthermore, subcontractors believe they have 
some control over the practice during this pre-award period; they can prevent their 
quotes from being shopped by submitting their quotes just before the main contractor's 
deadline for submission (Degn and Miller 2003). This strategy of "just-in-time" quote 
submission does provide some protection but can cause problems later. The main 
contractor cannot check the subcontractors' quotes for errors and incomplete scope; 
this can be used to justify any post-award bid shopping by the main contractor (May et 
al. 2001; Shash 1998). 
Post-award bid shopping 
This is considered the more damaging type of bid shopping to both the main and 
subcontractor, chiefly because, as mentioned earlier, it negates the benefits of the 
competitive tendering process (Degn and Miller 2003). Tendering encourages 
competition; each subcontractor is encouraged to present their best or most 
economical price for doing the work. Since the main contractor carries the risk in 
terms of time, quality and cost, inducing subcontractors to go below their most 
economical price increases not only the subcontractor's, but also the main contractor's 
risk. Arditi and Chotibhongs (2005) consider post-award bid shopping to strain 
subcontractor-main contractor relationships, whereas Degn and Miller (2003) 
condemn it as being unethical and damaging. However, as Smith Mojica and Clarke 
(2006) have commented, bid shopping is not illegal. 
Why bid shopping exists 
Unethical behaviour 
Main contractors generally bargain with subcontractors from a position of power, 
which May et al. (2001) consider can lead to unethical behaviour and exploitation of 
the subcontractor. Vee and Skitmore (2003), in their survey of professional ethics in 
the construction industry, found that post-award bid shopping is viewed as being 
unethical because the decision to bid shop deprives the subcontractor of work fairly 
won in a competitive tender. Post-award bid shopping is considered unfair and reveals 
commercially sensitive tendering information. Those that benefit from the practice 
consider it acceptable while those that suffer from it consider it to be wrong. 
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Bid shopping increases profit 
Post-award bid shopping does not reduce the contract price; any reduction in costs 
would be for the main contractor‟s benefit and increases their profit (Shash 1998). The 
prevailing opinion on why bid shopping occurs is that it appears to be attributed to the 
main contractor's desire to increase profit (Degn and Miller 2003; Smith Mojica and 
Clarke 2006).  
Bid shopping compensates for errors in tendering 
The time between the award of the main contract and the award of the subcontracts is 
termed the buy-out period. During the buy-out the contractor may find that the 
profitability of the project decreases for reasons such as: a subcontractor's quote used 
in compiling the submitted tender contained an incomplete scope of work; the main 
contractor‟s estimator was too keen to obtain the project, or the main contractor‟s 
estimator did not understand the scope of the project (Zwick and Miller 2004). A 
realisation of decreased profitability causes the contractor to either engage in bid 
shopping or to re-tender the works not yet subcontracted in an effort to regain 
profitability. This re-tendering is in fact another form of bid shopping because 
competing subcontractors are now aware of what the original lowest quoted price was 
(Zwick and Miller 2004). Indeed, many subcontractors think that the main contractor 
undertakes bid shopping to compensate for underbidding (Smith Mojica and Clarke 
2006). 
The main research question to be addressed is: what are the perceptions of Auckland 
mechanical and electrical subcontractors regarding bid shopping? The sub-questions 
to be addressed are: how frequently does bid shopping occur? How seriously is bid 
shopping viewed? What measures are taken by subcontractors to prevent bid 
shopping? What are the consequences of bid shopping for the subcontractor? In 
addition, this study also aims to determine if the prevalence of bid shopping has 
changed over time, and what implications this may have for the construction industry. 
The loss of revenue and margin for the subcontractor is an important and predictable 
consequence of bid shopping; this research aims to determine if there are other less 
well-known consequences for the subcontractor‟s business. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Bid shopping in Auckland commercial construction subcontracting was investigated 
using an interview survey approach. This study assumed a traditional competitive 
tendering situation in which the main contractor invites subcontractors to quote and 
the subcontracts and main contract are won through competitive tendering. 
The objective was to determine the subcontractors‟ view on how frequently main 
contractors bid shop quotes during tendering as well as their feelings about the 
practice. To achieve these objectives required the subcontractors to report on their 
opinions and knowledge. The most appropriate method for collecting such data was 
considered to be an interview survey, which “focuses on the respondents experience 
regarding the situation under study” (Naoum 2007: 56). The semi-structured face-to-
face interview method was chosen, in which the research instrument was a 
questionnaire. As no suitable questionnaire was discovered during the literature 
review, one was developed by the authors (contact the authors for the complete 
questionnaire). The advantages of the interview survey are high response rates and 
improved reliability. Reliability is improved because the interview conditions are 
known and the interviewee is the chosen respondent (Naoum, 2007).  
Bid shopping 
1167 
 The questionnaire collected both quantitative and qualitative data, using a mix of 
open and closed questions. A quantitative scale was devised to determine how often 
bid shopping is perceived to occur. A four category Likert type scale was developed to 
measure the seriousness with which bid shopping is viewed; the categories are 
mutually exclusive. The remaining survey questions were open-ended, requiring 
qualitative responses. Assurances of confidentiality and the lack of traceability helped 
in minimising non-responses. 
Since this research is concerned with the perceptions on bid shopping, a random 
sample of subcontractors from all trades could not be used, because the sample size is 
too small and because not all trades will experience bid shopping. The use of a 
random sample could miss some of those trades that are more likely to experience bid 
shopping, viz: the mechanical and electrical services trades. Due to this stratified 
sample and the sample size (10 participants from 2 trades), no statistical analysis was 
performed, and any generalisation of the results is limited. Analysis was limited to 
qualitative discussions and tabulating the frequency of each response to each of the 
questions or variables. 
RESULTS 
All participants indicated that bid shopping in the electrical and mechanical services 
trades occurred in at least 30% of all tenders for which quotations were submitted. 
Interestingly, the responses were split into two clear groups. The group of five 
participants who perceived bid shopping to occur in 30% or less of tenders were also 
the group with less direct experience of bid shopping, whilst the other group of five 
participants (with more direct bid shopping experience) perceived bid shopping to 
occur in 50% or more of tenders quoted on. All the participants thought that the 
practice of bid shopping was a serious matter and only two of the ten participants 
distinguished between pre- and post-award bid shopping. These two participants 
viewed pre-award bid shopping as „not serious‟ but viewed post-award bid shopping 
as „serious‟. The other 8 participants condemned both forms as either „serious‟ or 
„very serious‟. 
This study distinguished between two types of effects of bid shopping on the 
subcontractor: Type 1 effects are the result of having the firm's quote distributed to 
other competing subcontractors, while Type 2 effects result from complying with a 
main contractor's request to underbid a competitor (see Table 1). 
Two of the participants stated that nothing could be done to prevent their quotes from 
being bid shopped; the other eight participants tried to prevent bid shopping. They 
could only prevent their quotes from being shopped in the pre-award period. "Just-in-
time" bid shopping was found to be the most common method of preventing pre-
award bid shopping .Two other methods were also used: lump sum pricing, and 
emailing the quote directly to the relevant person. 
Six of the ten participants submitted the same price to all main contractors, regardless 
of whether the contractor practised bid shopping or not. Four participants did not 
submit the same price to all main contractors; they submitted higher quotes to those 
main contractors known to bid shop. 
Eight participants indicated that bid shopping caused them to distrust the main 
contractor; these eight participants also added comments to their responses. The most 
noteworthy concerned future inflated pricing and more aggressive claims for 
variations. 
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Table 1: Effects of bid shopping on the subcontractor 
Type 1 Effects of subcontractor's quote being bid-shopped Responses 
Loss of work and revenue which they had a fair chance of winning 6 out of 10 
Loss of competitive advantage due to quote details being revealed to competitors 2 out of 10 
Causes frustration to the staff because of unjustified loss of work 2 out of 10 
No effect because the company is diversified 1 out of 10 
Causes a reduction in margins due to the need to secure replacement work 4 out of 10 
Affects the quality of other subcontracted work done  1 out of 10 
Causes fluctuation in the workload which must be managed 1 out of 10 
Type 2 Effects of complying with contractor's request to underquote competitors Responses 
Loss of margin 7 out of 10 
Additional work and pressure on the project managers to recover margin  3 out of 10 
Keeps wages for trades people down thereby limiting the number of skilled staff that can 
be hired 
1 out of 10 
Affects the quality of the work done due to the need to recover margin 3 out of 10 
Relationships with their own suppliers and subcontractors get strained 1 out of 10 
Budget contingencies get used to lower the quoted price causing more pressure on staff 
since there is no longer any room for error 
1 out of 10 
Opens the door for future problems such as repeated requests to lower prices 1 out of 10 
 
Six of the ten participants thought that the incidence of bid shopping had remained the 
same over the period 2006 to 2008. Four participants thought that it had become more 
common. 
Participants had to consider the implications of bid shopping for the construction 
industry, and were given fixed responses and ticked all that applied (see Figure 1). 
DISCUSSION 
To determine the reliability of the responses regarding the frequency of occurrence of 
bid shopping, the basis for the participants‟ perception had to be related to their 
perceived frequency. A participant‟s perception based merely on hearsay alone is less 
reliable than one based on direct experience. The relationship revealed that the 
perception of frequency increased if bid shopping was encountered in a variety of 
forms. The responses appeared to be reliable because 8 out of 10 participants had 
direct experience with bid shopping by the main contractor. Only one participant 
based his opinion on hearsay and on unsuccessful tendering despite submitting the 
lowest conforming quote. This finding shows that bid shopping in the mechanical and 
electrical trades takes place often, which is significant because prior to this study the 
views on the incidence of bid shopping in Auckland were based solely on 
unconfirmed reports. 
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Figure 1: Implications of bid shopping 
Implications for the Construction Industry (n = 10)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
No implication
Increased competition between subcontractors
Decreased competition between subcontractors
Increased quality of work done by subcontractors
Decreased quality of work done by subcontractors
Increased safety measures taken by subcontractors on site
Decreased safety measures taken by subcontractors on site
Increased final value of the subcontracted work
Decreased final value of the subcontracted work
Increased number of inflated subcontractor quotes submitted
Decreased number of inflated subcontractor quotes submitted
Improves the subcontractor-main contractor relationship
Worsens the subcontractor-main contractor relationship
Increased integrity of the main contractors
Decreased integrity of the main contractors
Improved reputation of the main contractors
Tarnished reputation of the main contractors
No. of Participants (n)
 
Only two participants distinguished between pre-and post-award bid shopping. This 
small number is contrary to the finding reported in the literature: that most American 
subcontractors hold different views about pre- and post-award bid shopping and 
accept pre-award bid shopping as normal (Hinze and Tracey 1994). All ten 
participants viewed the general issue of bid shopping in tendering as either „Serious‟ 
or „Very Serious‟, which indicates that Auckland subcontractors‟ views on bid 
shopping are similar to subcontractors in other parts of the world, viz. that bid 
shopping by the main contractor is a serious issue for subcontractors. This result is not 
unexpected, and finds support in the literature (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005; Hinze 
and Tracey 1994; Jackson 2005; Uher and Runeson 1984). 
Once the subcontractor has submitted a quote to the main contractor there is nothing 
they can do to prevent their quotes from being shopped. The only effective action 
mentioned in the literature is to delay the quote submission to the main contractor for 
as long as possible, and is referred to as just-in-time submission (May et al. 2001). In 
this present study, just-in-time bid shopping was found to be the most common 
method of preventing pre-award bid shopping, and this result confirms its use as the 
chief preventative measure. Two other methods were also used which are not 
mentioned in the literature: lump sum pricing, and emailing the quote directly to the 
relevant person. Lump sum pricing was considered a preventative measure because 
the mechanical and electrical services trades are complex and quotes cannot be 
shopped without comparing details. Emailing the quote directly to the relevant person 
in the main contractor's office was seen as a preventative measure because if the quote 
were then distributed to other competitors, it would be concluded that it came from the 
email recipient.  
Inflating the price of quotes submitted to main contractors with a reputation for bid 
shopping is alternatively seen either as a measure to counter bid shopping, or as the 
end result of bid shopping. Its use, however, is uncommon (Hinze and Tracey 1984; 
May et al. 2001), although subcontractors inflating their quoted prices in anticipation 
of later being forced to reduce prices through bid shopping is an acknowledged 
strategy (Degn and Miller 2003). 
This present study wanted to investigate whether the subcontractors quoted the same 
price to all main contractors. The results were unexpected: four out of the ten 
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participants do not provide the same price to all main contractors. This is surprising 
because all ten participants also stated that the market for electrical and mechanical 
subcontractors was very competitive. Since this unequal pricing may have other 
explanations, the participants were presented with 4 fixed responses and asked to tick 
all that applied. The interesting aspect of this is that all four participants that did not 
provide the same price to all main contractors did so because the main contractor had 
a history of bid shopping. This finding is supported by the literature, which suggests 
that refusal to quote is a policy often used (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2005; Degn and 
Miller 2003; May et al. 2001; Uher and Runeson 1984).The six participants that 
provided the same price to all main contractors regardless of whether they were bid 
shopped or not, did so either because it was a good business strategy, or else because 
they were selective in which main contractor they wanted to work with, and indeed, 
would not quote to those they did not want to work with. These findings are surprising 
given the competitive nature of subcontracting in these trades, and suggest that bid 
shopping is a significant factor in subcontractors‟ pricing decisions.  
The major Type 1 and Type 2 effect (see Table 1) is the loss of work and revenue 
which the participants had a fair chance or winning were it not for the bid shopping. 
The second most significant Type 1 effect is the frustration due to unjustified loss of 
work. The effect on staff is again the second most significant Type 2 effect; staff are 
under pressure to improve profitability sacrificed in under-quoting. 
Participants reported that another consequence of bid shopping is the effect on the 
quality of the subcontracted work. This is due to their need to recoup revenue and 
margin lost as a result of reducing their quoted prices when bid shopped. The quality 
of work declines not only on the project on which bid shopping occurred, but also on 
other unrelated projects. The production of “substandard works” (Ng, Skitmore and 
Chung 2003: 5) on the quality of the bid shopped project was expected; the knock-on 
effect to other unrelated projects however, was an unexpected finding, not previously 
reported in the literature. 
Eight of the ten participants stated that bid shopping caused them to distrust the main 
contractor, a finding supported by Degn and Miller (2003). Two participants also 
stated that bid shopping caused them to try and claim variations to make up any loss 
through having been bid shopped. This finding is significant as this issue has not 
hitherto been addressed by the literature. 
All ten participants would not consider recovering tendering costs associated with 
work lost through bid shopping. This result is significant because the increased 
overheads must be recouped in some way, and this may explain the detrimental effect 
on quality of work on projects unrelated to the one on which bid shopping occurred. 
Eight of the ten participants considered that financial reasons were behind any 
decision by the main contractor to re-tender the work during the buy-out period. Three 
of these eight attributed it to profit maximisation. Main contractors are therefore 
viewed as motivated largely by financial considerations; and as Shash asserted, “some 
contractors include given subcontractors‟ quotations in their bids and, in an effort to 
increase profit, they squeeze subcontractors to reduce their prices” (1998: 223).  
Four of the ten participants thought that bid shopping had increased compared with 
the same period two years earlier. This result suggests a link between the incidence of 
bid shopping and the state of the construction market. A weak market with less work 
causes prices for construction work to be reduced. Maintaining margins in such a 
market becomes a major concern for main contractors [The New Zealand economy 
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showed a downturn at the start of 2008 and the economic outlook was revised 
downwards during 2008, and the start of a recession was confirmed (New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research, 2008)].  
The participants' views on the implications of bid shopping on the construction 
industry are summarised in Figure 1. Nine of the ten participants considered that bid 
shopping damaged the reputation and image of the main contractor. This is significant 
since the reputation and image of main contractors are criteria used by clients and 
consultants in the contractor selection process. All participants also thought that bid 
shopping decreased the quality of work done and led to an increase in the final value 
of the subcontracted work due to claims for variations. The other major implication of 
bid shopping was reported to be the decrease in safety measures that would be taken 
in order to reduce the subcontractor‟s costs. Seven of the ten participants thought that 
bid shopping increased competition between subcontractors. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Whilst bid shopping has been mentioned as part of research on issues such as ethics 
and tendering practice, few empirical studies have directly focussed on bid shopping, 
and specifically, sought the perceptions of subcontractors themselves on the effects of 
bid shopping on their business. Consequently, this research aimed to explore 
subcontractors' views on the impact of bid shopping on their own business, and what 
steps they take to counter the practice. The findings indicate that bid shopping in the 
mechanical and electrical services trades surveyed appears to takes place regularly in 
Auckland, and demonstrate that bid shopping is of concern to subcontractors and has a 
negative influence on their pricing, the quality of the work they do, and their safety 
measures taken when on site. The Auckland results are significant because they 
suggest that apart from the obvious loss in revenue to the subcontractor, bid shopping 
has less obvious effects on the subcontractor's business: frustration and stress on staff; 
fluctuating workloads that must be managed; loss of competitive advantage if the 
written quote is distributed; and it affects the quality of work done both on the project 
where bid shopping occurred and on other unrelated projects. It seems that the 
incidence of bid shopping increases during economic downturns, and the practice in 
general damages the image and reputation of the main contractor. 
The work presented here is limited; it relies heavily on only ten interviews, and the 
analysis is brief. The findings suggest that subcontractors cut corners on quality and 
safety and are more inclined to pursue variation claims on projects that have been bid 
shopped. Further research would serve to investigate these issues in more depth. The 
study did not distinguish between the size of subcontractors and the size of the main 
contractor firm referred to in the questions. The size of firm may provide different 
findings, as large subcontractors may be more (or less) inclined to comply with a 
request to reduce a quoted price, whereas smaller firms may not (or may) be as 
willing. The study did not distinguish between types of project the subcontractor 
quoted for. Design and build tenders may for example be more prone to bid shopping, 
particularly for the mechanical services trade, because main contractors would want to 
reassure themselves they were obtaining value for money and would supply the design 
to competing subcontractors.  
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